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Fields of Posthuman Kinship 
 
Ben Campbell 
 
 
There is a strong current to the contributions in this volume, and much of the kinship and 
genetics literature, that the issue at hand is how contemporary families are being made 
and talked about in the light of DNA transmission, Assisted Reproduction Technologies, 
and their relationship to other ‘non-natural’ means of making family members, such as 
adoption. This chapter questions the assumptions that kinship broadly equates with the 
domain of human family connections, and that ‘kinship and genetics’ concerns creative 
resolutions of genetic knowledge and familial contexts.  
 
There is a strong assumption here about what kinship consists of anthropologically, as a 
subset of human relations tied to the domestic domain. Focusing on interpersonal family 
relatedness, and kinship ‘ways of thinking’, privileges genealogical modes of reckoning 
and evaluating relationships. Even when importance is given to active practices, which do 
incorporate creative makings of family and relatedness (such as naming, feeding, and 
rituals of belonging), these are still embedded in a framework of how individuals are 
conceptually accommodated in networks and registers of human familiality  and identity, 
that happen not to rely on direct genetic filiation. My argument is that kinship as a 
comparative enquiry needs to bring relations with non-humans into view, to explore 
‘kinship’ dimensions beyond family connection. Genetic knowledge and technology 
reconfigures not only familial landscapes of information and reproductive choice, but 
also the relations between ‘the human’ and ‘the natural’. Biologists use kinship to discuss 
the relationship of the human genome with that of other species, and to keep this apart 
from social anthropologists’ use of it for differentiating conscious fields of social 
connection, would be to accept rather than problematize the cosmology of naturalism 
(Descola 2005), where biologists’ use of kinship refers to a knowable world of physical 
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connection common to all life forms, separate from anthropological worlds of particular 
cultural meanings.  
 
Comparative kinship studies have revealed numerous ways of connecting human and 
non-human worlds. Whether it is cattle with the Nuer (Evans-Pritchard 1940), pigs in 
Melanesia (Rappaport 1979, Strathern 1988), or consanguine plants and affinal prey in 
Amazonia (Descola 1996), human kinship has been enfolded in wider relations with the 
non-human world. Urbanized Euro-American society is clearly more detached from 
regular non-human convivialities (pet-keeping is popular but optional), but to neglect 
non-human interactions in ideas of kinship would be to miss out on perspectives for 
thinking anthropologically about kinship and genetics. At the origins of modern kinship 
theory, Feeley-Harnik comments that L. H. Morgan ‘used “breed”, “cross”, “half-breed”, 
and “quarter-breed” as if he were talking about his family’s herd of wool bearers’ 
(2001:58). In the Great Lakes area, people would speak of their kinship and marriage, 
and be telling Morgan simultaneously of beaver kinship, in ways that ‘intimately 
entwined fates of human and other creatures’ (ibid:80). Genomic comparisons now bring 
the human and non-human back into relation. The uniqueness or exceptionalism of 
human ontology and Euro-American kinship are given new problematics by genetics, and 
provide grounds for thinking comparatively about how kinship cosmologically locates the 
human in the world. It is not just in new ways of making and thinking about families that 
genetics transforms understandings of kinship, but in reflection on new kinds of 
intentional agency in a world where the boundaries of species, and their interrelations 
have become subject to unprecedented kinds of human intervention. 
 
By including non-humans in kinship perspectives, connections are made with discussions 
of ‘posthuman’ society. I use the British media’s response in 2003 to the scientific 
findings of the nation-wide investigation into likely environmental consequences of 
growing genetically modified crops in the UK, to claim that a relation of protective 
kinship between people and the non-human inhabitants of the landscape was discovered 
in this moment. A latent connectivity between people and environment was revealed on 
the verge of its irreversible conversion into a resource for biotechnological farming. If we 
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had thought that modern European kinship had shed any kind of extra-human cultural 
dependency, like the Nuer’s to cattle, and only entertained metaphorical conceits in 
anthropomorphic narratives (from Beatrice Potter to Bug’s Life), the prospect of 
genetically modified cropping systems, and the possibility of feral recombinant DNA 
stalking the hedgerows provoked a response of solidarity in the British media with the 
creatures of the countryside.        
 
I use the term ‘posthuman’ to mark changes in how the human can now be talked about 
with knowledge of the human genome, and the use of genetics to restructure interactions 
with other species. The category of human and its relation to the non-human are changed 
by the prospect of germline engineering. and DNA transfer across lines of species and 
phyla. Technologically mediated reproduction evokes explicit reflexivity on the 
autonomy of a natural world. Reproduction has been brought out of a naturalized black 
box of assumed processes and contexts of control. A circumspect anthropology for the 
new politics of human and non-human fertility moves kinship beyond strictly internal 
‘human’ concerns of relatedness. Novel opportunities for assisted choice in having 
children, and in designing the genetic agency of food crops, create a contested stage for 
the regulatory powers that strategically close down certain kinds of option. No longer are 
humans passive in the face of the genetic lottery of hereditary accident, nor are they 
situated at a distance from a self-reproducing realm of nature beyond human activity 
(Strathern 1992). It is the new configuration of possible life relations, and the move 
beyond the enlightenment clarity of exceptional, human conscious agency over an inert 
nature, that warrants the ‘post’ in question. 
 
What kinship is all about  
Recent attempts to recover anthropology’s claims to kinship expertise have included 
Franklin and McKinnon’s (2001) interrogation of the ways that new kinds of family 
relatedness are growing in contemporary processes of social change around the world, 
and in the face of new technological possibilities. Their overview extends from ‘kinning’ 
as a process of domesticating difference in the cultural heritage of adoptees in 
international adoption (Howell 2001), to the use of kinship as a term for  characterising  
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connections with analogical resemblances to human relatedness, such as in human-
machine hybrids (Helmreich 2001). 
 
In their valuable treatment, Franklin and McKinnon have not entirely escaped an implicit 
curiosity for ‘what kinship is all about’  (Schneider 1984). Although they take us through 
a host of ‘contingent and productive’ (Franklin and McKinnon 2001:7) contexts and 
conceptual linkages, there remains a sense that kinship with its ‘substantial-codings’ is 
about an area of social enclosure, congealed through embodiment, to do with ‘shared 
kind’ and familial closeness. This was in previous generations substantialized by 
anthropologists as ‘the domestic domain’ (Goody 1976), and embraced the household, 
the family, and the private as a coherent relational field in opposition to the public 
domain, where contrasting principles of sociality and exchange could be recognized.  
 
With structuralist exchange theory, an alternative view of the domestic was offered that 
started not from the primacy of descent, but from extra-domestic reciprocities in the 
reproduction of the domestic through ongoing affinity. The presence of the reproductive 
exchange relation, and the affinal other within the minimal unit of kinship, configure the 
domestic as already in articulation with alliances between types of difference. In the 
structuralist formulation non-humans figure only as elements that are good for thinking 
with, neglecting exchanges of less cerebral flows that bring non-humans into sociality: 
for instance, with life forms that respond through evolutionary domestication to our 
embodied relations with the world.1   
 
Jones argues that after hunters turned to arrows rather than spears,  
Wolves – dogs as they became – became more useful as they would chase 
and pull down wounded prey. Such a creature took at once a large step 
toward the fireside... At Ein Mallah in Israel, in a grave of the earliest 
farmers, is the skeleton of a puppy buried next to a child. A wild animal 
had become a member of the family. Soon its muzzle shrank, its teeth 
                                                
1 ‘We too cast unconscious evolutionary votes every time we reach for the most symmetrical 
flower or the longest French fry’ (Pollan 2001:262). 
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became smaller, its eye grew large and round, and the modern dog had 
arrived. (my emphasis, Jones 2000: 34) 
 
In contrast to ‘kin’, the terms ‘family’ and ‘household’ more readily include animal 
associations, as productive domestic assets, or as pets that can be seen as complementary 
members in families of affection - even as subjects substituting for human relatives. 
Against modern understandings that would restrict ‘kin’ only to other humans, Haraway 
(1997) uses kinship provocatively to place us as relational beings in an encounter with the 
strange productions of biotechnological capitalism. She invites us to think about the 
kinship we might have with them, in terms of concern for the relatedness of life, 
especially if we take account of their hybrid bioinformatic-lineages, and their 
confounding of conventional categories of being and object. 
 
Such apparent projections of the language of kinship to the non-human, or to human-
animated entities, are no longer so easily contained within the dualism of literal or 
metaphoric connection. Genetic knowledge, whether of human relations or modified 
organisms opens up areas of instability between the literal and the metaphoric. 
Anthropologists working in this field have charted the processes of normalisation or 
purification that people have shown in giving strategically conventional shape to 
biological facts (Thompson 2001), or have explored the pressure exercised by hybrid 
entities on notions of life and kinship (Helmreich 2001).    
 
Descola (2005) offers an ambitious, comparative typology for relations between the 
human and non-human. In his category of modern naturalism, a cosmology that presents 
the world out there as a mute, physical unity is set against the species-unique quality of 
human conscious agency. For Descola, artificial intelligence, or the recognition of 
human-like intelligence among higher primates, only emphasizes the human-centric 
properties of this scheme. His point is to emphasize the distinctiveness of this cosmology 
in comparative terms, and warn against its inappropriate extension to understand the 
relations of humans and non-humans in other societies that ‘have not hesitated to invite 
into the concert of their social life the most modest of plants, and the most insignificant 
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of animals’ (my translation, 2005:15). A problem with his approach is that he compares 
Amazonian hunters and cultivators with the great thinkers of the enlightenment, to the 
exclusion of other modern co-evals, who appear in the work of Feeley-Harnik (2001, 
n.d.) to have furnished the foundational modern thinkers for the study of kinship 
(Morgan) and evolution (Darwin) with some of their most potent images, in apparent 
defiance of human exceptionalism. Taking kinship beyond the human, and beyond the 
literalism of genetic substance as defining relatedness, arguments can be made for 
thinking outside the cosmology of naturalism, and in terms of relational universes of 
intimate responsibility that cross the human/non-human divide. The prospect of 
displacing ecological communities and their iconic songbirds with genetically modified 
crops challenged  vernacular, analogical relatedness across species.    
  
Genetically Modified Crops and the Kinship of Life  
To track biotechnology’s relational pathways, I use kinship in a very broad sense, as a 
technology for the organisation of solidarities, desire and exchange, not confined to 
specifically human domains of reference, [but is this justified? Or is it just that the 
word ‘kinship’ – like ‘family’ – is an odd job word with a range of usages? – 
whether it is justified depends on the success of the chapter’s arguments developed 
hereafter] 
 to analyse the British media’s reception of the scientific evaluation of genetically 
modified organisms.  
 
In the mounting controversy over GMOs in Europe from the mid-1990s, people gave 
many reasons for opposing these crops’ introduction into the food chain.2 These ranged 
from ‘tampering with nature’, lack of labelling information about product content for 
consumers, to concern about multinational control over world food supply. In terms of 
World Trade Organization agreements, the only legal basis for resisting GMOs was 
evidence of harm to human health or the environment. The British government’s 
scientific advice suggested minimal health implications. To complement a public opinion 
                                                
2 For an excellent treatment of the European contexts for opposition to GMOs, see Bauer and 
Gaskell (2002). Wynne (2001) gives an incisive analysis of the basis for public mistrust of UK 
institutions intended to communicate scientific advice. Lezaun (2004) analyses the different 
approaches to marketing GM products and consumer research in generating scepticism about 
multinationals’ motives.  
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consultation exercise held in 2003, a decision was made examine the crops scientifically 
for environmental impact. ‘Farm Scale Evaluations’ (FSE) on over 200 farms across the 
country looked for three years at the effects of growing crops (modified for herbicide 
resistance) on the plants, insects and birds in field locations. The results were published 
on 16th October 2003 and were widely reported and discussed by the press. 
  
Media reporting is obviously designed to impact on cultural nerve-endings. A notable 
reverence for the details of the findings as scientifically objective is apparent, but latent, 
analogically social readings are simultaneously emergent. Even in the de-
contextualisation of the facts from public concerns about GMOs, these latent readings 
invoke missing relationships of people to agricultural environments. The newspapers play 
on an iconic cultural status of birds, with their lyrical-sounding vernacular names, and the 
interdependence of life forms under threat from dosings of weedkiller that, only by 
implication, include humans. In the public debate where socio-political arguments over 
the technology were hierarchically displaced by legal and scientific authority, the birds, 
weeds and mini-beasts can be seen to stand analogically, for human presence. All the 
weight of social concerns about GMOs now hung in the environmental basket.     
 
On the 17th October 2003 the Independent (a centre-left newspaper) frontpage headline 
declared,  
‘Proven: the environmental dangers that may halt GM revolution’.  
The Farm Scale Evaluations confirmed  
conservationists’ concerns that the GM crops scheduled for growth in Britain 
would mean yet another blow for the insects, flowers and birds that have been 
decimated by more than 30 years of intensive farming. 
 
In its inside page report Chris Pollock, chairman of the FSE scientific steering committee 
drew attention to the uniqueness of this research that sought to anticipate the effects of 
cultivating the new crops: 
It is the first time a novel agricultural technology has been trialled extensively before it 
has been introduced rather than us examine the consequences after it has been introduced 
[pdf version has “quote here, 
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not after brackets” – not of my doing as original indenting removed] (The 
Independent 17 October 2003: 4). 
 
I will concentrate on three themes of the media reporting of the results. One is the picture 
of biodiversity in field ecology that emerged from the trials, the second is the 
consideration given to the desirability to people and society of further intensification of 
farming, and thirdly an issue which the trials did not address, but which most of the 
newspapers could not leave alone - the prospect of cross-pollination from GM crops with 
‘wild relatives’. 
 
Many newspapers presented factual findings adjacent to commentary. The Daily 
Telegraph (right wing) provided a ‘question and answer’ section, where ‘What did they 
discover? was answered 
GM oilseed rape and GM beet damaged the environment. There were fewer 
butterflies, bees and invertebrates because there were 80% fewer weeds and 
seeds for them to eat. (The Daily Telegraph 17 October 2003:3).  
The Guardian (centre-left) made a section ‘Birds and bees: how wildlife suffered’, 
itemising the different outcomes for a range of species under GM and conventional 
farming. A previously little researched creature the springtail, a small wingless arthropod, 
was one of the few species that seemed to benefit under GM oilseed rape, due to the 
timing of weedkiller application and the amount of decaying plant matter available to it. 
 
The (‘establishment’) Times countryside editor described the results as painting ‘a grim 
picture of a landscape denuded of many farmland birds, butterflies, insects, and common 
field plants’, and a Royal Society for the Protection of Birds spokesman was quoted as 
saying, that GM crops could mean ‘the final nail in the coffin for some species’ (The 
Times 17 October 2003: 9). The tabloid, right-wing Daily Mail declared ‘farming the so-
called Frankenstein crops risks creating a biological desert by wiping out wild plants, 
butterflies, bees and birds’ (The Daily Mail 17 October 2003: 6-7). The Guardian 
pronounced that the further deprivation of habitat and food from birds and animals would 
be ‘an irreplaceable loss to the countryside which once teemed with the sights and sounds 
of creatures on and above the ground’ (The Guardian 17 October 2003: 1). The editorial 
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in the Independent noted the finding that ‘Fewer weeds means fewer – and fewer 
varieties of – insects, and that in turn means fewer corn buntings, skylarks and 
yellowhammers’ (The Independent 17 October 2003: 20). The Guardian reported that 
governmental responses ‘were cautious’, but the Environment Minister Elliott Morley 
was quoted ‘GM crops had severe implications for birds’. In the chorus of doom it was 
left to Paul Rylott from the industry body promoting GM to argue ‘scaremongering is not 
supported by the facts’ and claims that the crops would ‘wipe out wildlife’ were 
unfounded (The Independent 17 October 2003: 5). 
 
What has all this to do with kinship? Let us take ‘severe implications for birds’. The 
creatures themselves are not going to consciously deliberate the consequences of GM 
oilseed rape, beet and maize, but ‘implication’ and its cognates ‘imply’ and ‘implicate’ in 
my dictionary bring up ‘entwine together’, ‘enfold’, ‘involve’, ‘entangle’, ‘express 
indirectly’, and ‘insinuate’. The implications are for people to consider on behalf of the 
birds, in the knowledge about the likely avian outcomes of intensified applications of 
weedkiller in the fields. Herbicide-tolerant GMO cultivation would more efficiently 
convert sunlight into plant growth, to the greater advantage of human food crops against 
weed competition, and the wildlife that depend on the weeds. It is the human senses that 
register ‘irreplaceable loss’, ‘grim picture’, and the series of deprivations along the food 
chain from weeds through insects to birds, whose names carry cultural genealogies 
evocative of pastoral symphonies and Shakespearean sonnets. It is to human ears and 
eyes, that disappearing sights and sounds will matter. Radcliffe-Brown’s totemic question 
‘Why all these birds?’ might be asked here, and as Lévi-Strauss put it ‘The connexion is 
not arbitrary, nor is it a relation of contiguity’ (1962:147). What kinds of extra-species 
solidarities, desires and exchanges are called forth in the brute demonstration of 
impending biodiversity decline? I will take this up later.   
 
Faced with a decisive moment in the extent to which British field ecology should be 
dedicated to the cause of maximized efficiency in farming practices, priorities of 
culturally determined value enter the frame. The left-leaning Mirror tabloid newspaper 
used dramatic headlines to emphasize the choice, borrowing the title of Rachel Carson’s 
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book as its main statement ‘Silent Spring’, continuing with ‘Birds and Bees: technology v 
wildlife’. The Independent’s editorial writer was clear about the alternatives now 
presented to decision makers: 
the choice comes down to enhanced yields versus reduced biodiversity. 
Broadly, that is the choice that has been offered by intensive farming since 
the Industrial Revolution. And there has been a growing recognition in recent 
decades that farming policy should be tending in the opposite direction to that 
offered by today’s genetically modified crops. The movement should be away 
from intensive farming and towards the preservation of biodiversity. You do 
not have to be a 100 per cent organic enthusiast to appreciate that the 
environmental costs of modern farming methods are too high (The 
Independent 17 October 2003:20) 
 
The Guardian’s account of the trial results set the government’s policies for promoting 
biotechnology against other pledges made to protect the environment. Chief among these 
was the aim of reversing the loss of birdlife in the countryside, which the government had 
identified as a ‘quality of life’ indicator (meaning human life). It quoted David Gibbons 
(a panel member of the Farm Scale Evaluations) saying the results were ‘dramatic’ in the 
evidence that ‘[t]here will be less food for birds’ (The Guardian 17 October 2003: 4).  
 
The science journalist Andy Coghlan, writing in New Scientist, observed that in contrast 
to the balance of farming and wildlife in UK and Europe, farmers in the US and Australia 
use powerful broad-spectrum weedkillers to create  
fields sterilized of everything except the crop. Farmland there is purely for 
business, and if people want to see wildlife, they can visit national parks. But 
in Europe, farmland is used for leisure as well as producing food, and 
conservationists want farmers to be kinder to what wildlife remains (New 
Scientist 18 October 2003: 8).  
Coghlan added the UK has witnessed a ‘catastrophic decline’ in a number of bird species 
since WWII with modern agriculture’s expansion of field sizes at the expense of 
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hedgerows, the use of agro-chemicals, and the increase in winter crops, that remove 
fallow sequences. 
 
Counter arguments were presented in the conservative Daily Telegraph. Its editorial 
contended that risks from GM crops were no greater than with what had happened with 
‘conventional crops over the last 9,000 years’, and that anti-GM ‘feeling’ is simply 
motivated by ‘fear of the new’ (The Daily Telegraph 17 October 2003: 27). The 
Independent’s show of balanced coverage included the claim from Paul Ryllott of the 
Agriculture Biotechnology Council that ‘this evidence reiterates commercial experience 
from around the world, that GM crops are more flexible and can enhance biodiversity’ 
(The Independent 17 October 2003:5). Key to this argument was the finding that of the 
crops trialled, growing GM maize was less damaging to wildlife than ‘conventional’ 
maize, that required especially powerful weedkillers.  
  
The Daily Mail quoted the Environment minister Elliot Morley restating the legally 
determined position regarding withdrawal of approval for the new crops: ‘GM crops can 
only be grown if they get consent. Whether they get consent depends on whether there 
are environmental impacts’ (The Daily Mail 17 October 2003: 6). Anthropologists will be 
interested to see how the social aspects of technology assessment become 
compartmentalized as separate from environmental ones. The effects of this boundary 
making are powerful in giving priority to scientific realism, that establishes as more 
solidly reliable, a foundational domain of nature and biology, that can also be recognized 
as operating in the area of assisted human reproduction. As with the latter, one might 
expect to find all manner of relational enfoldings, entwinings, and entanglements of 
tactics and representations that blur dichotomous views of nature and culture. In this area, 
Edwards (Introduction) draws attention to ‘boundary objects’ whose ambivalent 
relationship to purified versions of nature or culture provides people with opportunities 
for innovative practices of living and ‘kinning’. Another effect of the enforced 
compartmentalisation of environmental truth and value fenced off from relationships of 
social and political ‘domains’, is to let loose symbolic inflections of the environmental as 
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implying narratives of the social and political in analogical refractions of moral 
responsibility. Issues of metaphor and likenesses of kinship will be taken up later. 
 
The final component to think about in the media stories is transgenic pollination. Here we 
see the pollon spores of modified crops seeking out relatives in the British countryside. 
The Farm Scale Evaluations had not actually investigated this dimension of GM crops, 
but a study from the Department of Environment and Rural Affairs had just been 
published before the FSE report. It had found that GM pollen from oilseed rape had 
travelled distances of over 25 kms, and would be likely to cross-fertilize with Brassica 
rapa, the wild turnip or ‘bargeman’s cabbage’ (Farmer’s Guardian 17 October 2003: 7). 
It is these modified genes going ‘feral’ and roaming freely to breed with native species, 
that has prompted talk in the newspapers of herbicide- or insect-resistant ‘superweeds’. 
The Farmer’s Guardian quoted a Friends of the Earth spokesperson: ‘We would be 
starting a huge outdoor experiment’ (ibid: 7). In contrast to ‘alarmist’ interpretations, an 
industry spokesman said the research on cross-pollination, ‘merely confirms well-
documented evidence that natural hybridisation between the species occurs at very low 
levels’ (ibid: 7).  
 
In recognising that some GM crops have evolutionary relatives, and that genetically 
compatible alliances could be made ‘in nature’ beyond the intentions of biotechnological 
design, (with the modified genes giving rise to consequences in species’ evolution 
bearing the trace of humanly selected traits), the language of kinship used by geneticists 
and anthropologists is commingled. Biotechnologists, as evidenced by the spokesman 
quoted above, oscillate between the familiar normalising language of biology as the 
routine inevitability of life processes, and the transformational artifice of using genetic 
traits in novel combinations to human advantage. Haraway remarks that transgenic 
organisms ‘simultaneously fit into well established taxonomic and evolutionary 
discourses and also blast widely understood senses of natural limit’ (1997: 56). Further, 
she pursues the substantialized power, and hybrid agency of recombinant DNA life 
forms, commenting that ‘refiguration of the kinship between different orders of life, the 
generative splicing of synthetic DNA and money produces promising genetic fruit’ 
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(1997:66). Her use of ‘kinship’ both mocks continuing ideological assumptions of 
naturalness, and draws attention to how the reproduction of humans, creatures, and 
machine life has shifted beyond conventional parameters of fertility.  
 
In biotechnology’s discourse of GM crops not endangering biodiversity at large, insisting 
on the ‘substantial equivalence’ of GM and conventional foods, and arguing against the 
need for boundaries to limit cross-contamination with non-GM or organic farms, it 
argued for a case-by-case assessment of the new crops, rather than a verdict on GM per 
se. To deny the possibility of GM plants’ sexual reproduction with wild relatives is 
comparable to strategies of kinship ‘truncation’, noticed in practices of selective 
solidarity. The motive of denying kinship with wild plants, of arguing that the transgenic 
crops are containable for human purposes, and will not form hybrid kin associations, is a 
recognizable ‘officializing strategy’ (Bourdieu 1977) to privilege certain networks of 
relatedness over others.  
 
The media’s treatment of the release of the Farm Scale Evaluations was noticeably 
deferential to the language of science. (It was mostly left to the cartoonists to bring out 
more imaginative and transgressive views of how nature, society, money and politics 
were simultaneously at play in the process of assessing GM crops.) Such was the 
effectiveness of separating out environmental science from ‘ethical’ and ‘economic’ 
categories of public concern, that statements about “less food for birds” were not 
contextualized within the register of science, by arguments that the hungry of the world 
needed feeding. (These arguments resurfaced when government decisions were taken). 
The newspapers dramatized the science of wildlife loss, but did not explore the 
relationship of field ecology and society, other than as a choice about economic or 
biodiversity values. Ecological science was imagined to speak for itself, or to stand as a 
view on what was happening ‘out there’, with the issue of people’s relationship to the 
landscape silently contained. This could reflect the distance of protected authenticity by 
which Descola (1996, 2005) has characterized Western relationships of ‘naturalism’ 
towards the environment. Science was very effectively kept apart from any visibility of 
emotional or other relational connections people might have with springtails, skylarks, or 
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corn buntings. The environment was there to be seen and taken in as a contained and 
knowable system, but it missed the element of human presence, apart from tractor 
drivers, or commentators with a scientific or economic stake. 
 
It thus appeared as the introduction of a different order of knowledge, when a 
personalized human dimension of interactive and subjective presence relating to this 
threatened ecology cropped up in a corner of the media. It came in the figure of Les 
Firbank, the scientific leader of the Farm Scale Evaluations. Interviewed in the New 
Scientist, he revealed a kinship connection with the British farming landscape. Raised on 
a small farm in the county of West Yorkshire, his PhD was a study of the population 
dynamics of an arable weed (the corncockle). He described his family’s direct experience 
of ecological change:  
I can remember a period when I was a kid in Yorkshire when we had 
cowslips all over the farm. By the time I was 10 most of them had gone. We 
thought it was just one of those things. We had no idea it was because of the 
way we were managing the land. We had put too much manure on it. As a 
family we didn’t want to do any harm. That issue – how to balance farming 
and wildlife – has always driven my research interests. (My emphasis, 25 
October 2003:46). 
 
So at last a human dimension that involves a very conventional ‘kinship’ – a family with 
a livelihood of interaction with fields, animals and plants - is made to appear as key to the 
motivation of the chief scientist, that enfolds, entwines and entangles a scientist’s 
reflexive practice with a relational context of human and non-human conviviality. The 
Scotsman newspaper encapsulated a conscientious relationship to the farming landscape 
by using an old-fashioned English term of ethically instrumental kinship with the land – 
‘good husbandry’. 
 
Discussion 
As Firbank and others made clear, it was really the herbicides that were on trial for their 
environmental harm, rather than the crops modified to resist them. The genes were only 
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part of a weedkiller management package, whose impact on a range of environmental 
issues, such as protection of birds and organic farming, constructed particular lines of 
opposition. Issues of boundaries and their transgression (between nature and society, GM 
and non-GM, profit and biodiversity) loomed large in these debates, and confirm 
Franklin’s insistence on looking at ‘boundary work’ performed in the maintenance of 
kinship, gender and ‘the marketing of these lines, species, and families of products’ 
(2001:315). The biotechnology industry and the organic certification business are equally 
involved in the politics of redefining commodities, consumer wishes, markets and nature. 
Boundaries are not present without categorical labour to make them evident, and 
boundaries of different orders play off each other: from criteria of food labelling, to crop 
planting limits drawn on the ground. It was noticeable how the image of Britain as a 
‘small, windy island’ with a closely interdependent farmland and human population, 
served to differentiate topologies for intensive agriculture between the US with its vast, 
open prairies and UK conditions. The territorial mosaic of farmland and wildlife habitat 
use-purposes in the UK was too mixed-up for any simple implementation of protective 
separation distances between GM and non-GM.  
   
My argument is that an extra-human relatedness (a kin-like analogy) was actualized in 
the conflict over GMOs when food production for humans was presented starkly as a 
lethal loss of food for biodiversity. When people were confronted with the prospect of a 
diminished ‘nature’ no longer autonomous, and when the regenerative capacity of the soil 
and the creatures living from it was made negotiable, and brought into a deliberative 
public sphere, latent solidarities of interest projected across the human/non-human divide. 
The ‘kinship’ resonances of GMOs have to be recovered from noises and silences. The 
media’s response to knowledge about threats to farmland wildlife respected the narrative 
power of scientific expertise in descriptions of the natural food chain. The newspapers 
were entranced by this depiction of another world, that humans could appreciate at a 
relation of respectful distance. The lay-expert divide appeared to be credible in a moment 
of awe displayed in the face of the extent and content of what the research had 
discovered. But the scientific frame did not for long hold the discursive bounds of the 
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debate over GM. Four months later, Clare Devereux of the Five Year Freeze coalition 
commented:  
The government just does not get it. The public is way ahead in 
understanding that agricultural biotechnology is about a lot more than just the 
science. It is about livelihoods, choice, culture, the biodiversity of our 
landscape, the survival of small farmers – and GM crops could potentially 
threaten all of these (Guardian 20 February 2004:8). 
 
Earlier, I touched on the debate about totemism in anthropology. Clearly, the relationship 
of wildlife to people in contemporary Britain is not operating on the same kind of 
grounds as is found in kinship practices organising moiety affinities around non-human 
identity hooks.3 What kind of otherings and proximity with the non-human can instead be 
discussed?  
 
Lévi-Strauss (1962) presented so-called totemic phenomena as a variety of ways for 
organizing relations between people via languages of non-human differentiation (it was 
the differences between differences of kind that resembled each other). Metonymic 
identifications are not the issue – with totemism or GMO opposition. But nor will 
‘metaphoric’ kinship serve the purpose of the argument here. For Ingold (1996), 
metaphor depends on a pre-structured separation of nature from culture, that fails to 
attend to how people and environments interact. Human affinities with the natural world 
are more than tokens of signifying convention.  
 
The birds, butterflies and bees of UK farmland, I would argue, became in a process of 
implication the imagined community of the British people. Their presence and their 
relationships of countryside interaction, haunt the gaps in the reporting of the scientific 
evaluations, through a long-standing cultural and scientific relationship with field 
ecology. The image of the ‘entangled bank’ is pertinent here, that Darwin referred to in 
The Origin of Species, with its ‘singing, flittering flow of creatures’ and their ‘hidden 
                                                
3 See Wagner (1977) for an analysis of one such kinship system in New Guinea, which takes 
‘analogical’ flows of ideas about care and responsibility to explain the work of maintaining 
appropriate distinctions between categories of kin. 
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bonds of descent’. Feeley-Harnik (n.d.) asks again Radcliffe-Brown’s question when 
pondering the totemic puzzle, ‘why all these birds?’ His answers, she argues, were overly 
socio-centric, neglecting the cross-species bonds of sociality. The importance of birds to 
Darwin (e.g. Galapagos finches, and the genealogy of the European rock dove) came 
from an interest in the intimate kinship between humans and birds in con-social dwelling. 
In particular it was the rearing of ‘fancy’ pigeon breeds by handloom silkweavers in 
London, and their expert eyes for selecting iridescence of plumage for trait enhancement, 
which provided Darwin with the idea of modifying the weavers’ ‘artificial selection’ to 
become his ‘natural selection’.  
 
Feeley-Harnik argues that since before Darwin’s time there has been a sensitivity to bio-
geographical change through avian imagery, in which birds have acted as significant 
markers of transforming ecologies. (Remember the Labour government had made birds a 
‘quality of life indicator’). I imagine people in boardrooms of biotech companies after the 
trials, asking Radcliffe-Brown’s question ‘why all these birds?’ The farm ecology on 
which the GM evaluations were performed was a social terrain on which the British, and 
their multinational corporate cousins would have to negotiate over their novel plant 
familiars’ rights for co-residence (‘in a small island’). The acceptability of laboratory-
modified, vegetable quasi-cousins were here linked to the fate of soil organisms, wild 
seed dispersal, and the survival within agri-culture of fat hen, springtails, corn buntings 
and skylarks. 
 
Science can be a form of politics by other means (Latour 2004), but its power lies in 
presenting a world of fact beyond particular value perspectives. As social, cultural, and 
other consequences of GM farming were credited less authority for policy making than 
scientific evidence, the creatures of farmland bio-diversity substituted to make a sociality 
of life, photosynthesis, and controlled ecological competitiveness acquire a narrative of 
moral-political judgement about changing times. The sub-liminal substitution of British 
rural (human) communities and wider consumers for the fate under biotech management 
of the mini-beasts, bugs, and weeds is more than a metaphorical association. The GM 
crop trials reactivated an old relationship of mutual attendance between people and birds, 
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but now in terms of the language of technological choice, or the deliberative ‘share’ 
between agriculture and biodiversity. 
 
There is no single British, or even English cultural relationship with birds and the 
countryside. and indeed the important fact is the diversity of actors and discourses 
contending with each other in environmental politics. The anti-GM coalition ranged from 
Prince Charles, mainstream conservation organisations and neo-pagans, through to anti-
capitalists. However, as a general cultural process, a permeability of the language of care, 
protection and nurturance across the human/non-human divide is on the increase. This is 
apparent in the transfer of the language of compassionate ‘adoption’ to non-humans 
(gorillas, whales etc.). An anti-vivisection campaign poster in 2006 features a laboratory 
monkey’s face beneath a plea for ‘Next of Kin’. To non-British people, this can appear to 
be a distinctive national attitude. The film maker Kusturica made a kinship analogy, 
angered about a scene cut by the British censor, where a cat attacked a pigeon. A 
journalist put to him that ‘You don’t realize what an emotive issue pigeons are in 
England’. Kusturica responded  
‘Was [the censor] brought up by pigeons or something?’ He continued, ‘What 
is the problem with you English? You killed millions of Indians and Africans, 
and yet you go nuts about the circumstances of the death of a single Serbian 
pigeon. I am touched you hold the lives of Serbian birds so dear, but you are 
crazy. I will never understand how your minds work.’ (The Guardian 4 
March 2005).  
 
 
Conclusion 
In talking about posthuman kinship my purpose has been to recognize the junctures of 
human fertility history, and to talk of a parallel realisation that the way anthropologists 
have pursued the question of ‘what is kinship all about?’ in the West has tended to ignore 
the value of looking at how kinship is not simply about humans. Even if divides are 
maintained in a common sense way between humans and non-humans, both the contexts 
in which human kinship is lived out, and the consideration given to animals and plants as 
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adjuncts, instruments and embodiments of familial intentionality deserve recognition. 
Kinship always needs to be placed in context, including those involving non-human 
interactions. Otherwise relatedness is ideologically divorced from the embodied 
conditions in which terms of connection are actually lived: the activities of making home, 
caring for relatives through affection bestowed on kinspeople’s pets, and the symbolic 
work performed by celebrating, for example, home-produced food, or taking a ‘family 
walk’ in a country park, or visiting a place where a relative grew up. If the comparative 
study of kinship is not to be confined to culturally specific definitions, it deserves to be 
viewed as a creative technology for making relations of solidarity, desire, and exchange.  
 
Whereas kinship served in modern anthropology to differentiate the internal organisation 
of disparate systems of socio-cultural reproduction, the contexts in which relatedness now 
operates demand new parameters of thought. Arguments about the naturalized grounding 
of kinship in biology, as Franklin (2001) points out, need to take account of how biology 
has shifted. How biology offers resources for thinking who we are, (both as social actors, 
and as anthropologists), and how we understand our interactions as substantial flows with 
effects on hosts of humans and non-humans, brings relational subjectivity in confluence 
with governance, technology, social movements, and the global economy.  
 
GM evaluation in the UK produced a refracted illumination of these relations, made 
visible through their opacity in a biological vision of the non-human world in suspension 
from directly human concerns. It was a suspension made possible by a combination of the 
authority of science to speak disinterestedly (and to surprise expectations), with the 
notion of the ecosystem as a measurable system of relations. GM technology was 
assessed for its impact on the non-human environment, to make informed decisions about 
environmental implications for birds, and people. Eco-system biology managed a 
containment of technological cause and effect within a strictly material world, to produce 
a prediction of consequences to be subsequently processed through evaluative systems of 
a different order: global food politics, social demands for countryside protection, and 
concerns for the survival of non-GM farming. Human exceptionalism to the natural world 
was thus instantiated in terms of what could be impartially known, distinct from 
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processes of deciding on GM technology that were situated within a domain of 
competing and contingent values. In these respects it would hardly be possible to find as 
clear an example of Descola’s (2005) cosmology of modern naturalism. It is the 
incompleteness of the naturalist ontology to account for the responses of extra-human 
connection evidenced by the newspapers’ reporting of the GM trials, that makes the idea 
of a human exceptionalist cosmology hard to sustain. 
 
My central point has been to suggest that this starkly di-morphic organisation of 
knowledge for technological governance produced conditions for an analogical 
identifications across the human/non-human divide. The vision of imperilled wildlife was 
met with a reciprocal articulation of ethical responsibility. While there are possibilities 
for anthropological explanation of this response within what has conventionally been 
taken as kinship (for instance the con-social intimacies of Darwin’s weaver families and 
their doves, or the experience of land-family relationships revealed by the farm trials 
coordinator Les Firbank), I want to emphasize how genetic knowledge of humans, non-
humans, and humanly modified organisms re-situates how we can think of ourselves 
relationally to the non-human world.    
 
The impact of genetic knowledge and technology has been frequently described in 
hyperbolic language. Woolfson, for instance, proclaims that with the discovery of 
evolutionary process through genetic variation ‘[I]n an instant, the erosion of mankind’s 
innocence was complete’ (2004: 46). In his book An Intelligent Person’s Guide to 
Genetics he also concludes  
If every aspect of our behaviour is shaped to some extent by our genetic 
programming, artificial modifications of these programs should enable key 
aspects of ourselves – including our shape, lifespan, intelligence, sense of 
equality, capacity for compassion, love, sexuality, empathy, aesthetics, justice 
and morality, all once assumed to be inviolable aspects of our humanity – to 
be modified or reconfigured from first principles. (ibid: 204.). 
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My angle is to suggest that confident human exceptionalism, as species-specific 
biological, moral, and subjective alterity to the rest of nature is over, even if not in the 
mechanistic terms Woolfson proposes. This prompts us to look at our shared genomic 
similarities with other species, and our continuing influence on the evolution of non-
human organisms (Pollan 2001), as well as the increasing possibilities for tweaking the 
normal flow of fertility events. Evidence for fractured boundaries of the human comes in 
the multiple arenas where boundary making of human and non-human is now being 
asserted. The UK’s Human Fertilisation and Embryology act, for example, has several 
references to experimental hamster fertilisation and embryology, and the legal 
requirement not to let more than a minimal number of cells develop. But in artistic works 
too, the moral exceptionalism of humanity in relation to animals has become a theme that 
is being examined in radical ways, for instance, in terms of analogies between genocide 
and the treatment of animals (Coetzee 1999), and in terms of sexuality (Albie 2004). 4 
 
The ‘End of History’ author Fukuyama uses genetics to berate Leftist thought for 
imagining infinite possibilities for people to change the conditions they are born into, but 
argues history is, after all, continuing with genetic advances. His worry is that  
biotechnology will cause us in some way to lose our humanity – that is, some 
essential quality that has always underpinned our sense of who we are and 
where we are going, despite all of the evident changes that have taken place 
in the human condition through the course of history. Worse yet, we might 
make this change without recognizing that we had lost something of great 
value. We might thus emerge on the other side of a great divide between 
human and posthuman history and not even see that the watershed had been 
breached because we lost sight of what that essence was. (2002: 101).   
  
Fukuyama (a proponent of regulation), and Woolfson (an inevitablist),5 fill the analysis of 
the future with machines and protected essences. My argument is that neither machine 
                                                
4 Edward Albie’s play The Goat or ‘Who is Sylvia?’ explores aspects of innocence and horror in a 
man’s revealed love for a goat, and the limits to the tolerance of desire within a modern family.  
5 Woolfson comments “The largely irrational urge to preserve our current incarnation unchanged 
is no different from wanting to keep red telephone boxes or milkmen” (2004: 207). 
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nor essence encapsulates what being a human is all about, and that rather than the 
question ‘who is a relative?’, the question ‘how do I relate to you?’ (whether staring in 
the eyes of an IVF infant, a goat, or at a genetically modified tomato on the supermarket 
shelf), will continue to perplex, and produce differentiation, in new and unpredictable 
ways. This framing points kinship in the direction of asking how, and for what purposes, 
are people making analogies and solidarities with other beings, and how are genetic and 
relational discourses articulated, or muted, in competing knowledge registers when a 
particular conflict becomes characterized as centred on genetics? For Descola, genetics 
has cosmologically enhanced the scientifically knowable unity of the external physical 
world, while human interiorities generate an unmanageable diversity of value systems. In 
this chapter I have attempted to demonstrate recalcitrant analogical connections among 
moderns. Despite Descola’s naturalist cosmology, they have (1) practices of family and 
relational identity that confound the brute segregation of human and non-human, and (2) 
the prospect of reduced wildlife in genetically modified agriculture evinced a co-
citizenship (contra Descola 2005:542) with non-human others in a post-exceptionaL 
image. This was not so much the ‘lost innocence’ that Descola speaks of, but a new 
visualisation of relationships that drags the silent nature of naturalism from its condition 
of mute insentience (admittedly by excessively human interventions), and now asks what 
kind of ties with the population of ‘the inanimate’ might be envisageable.   
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